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V.—DISCUSSIONS.
ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WAKING AND
DfiEAMING.
UPON what principle we distinguish waking and dreaming is a
problem which can be outlined symmetrically ; there are two faots
and two fancies. The faots, given for what they are worth, appear
to be these : in waking we take dreams to be hallucinatory, but
the standpoint of dreaming is not converse ; and secondly, we are
sbirply aware of a contrast when we wake up, but not necessarily
of a change when we go to sleep. The fancies seem, ten once in a
way, to be no more illuminating than the facts. A common dis-
tinction between waking and dreaming is made iu point of vivid-
ness ; but the U3ual addition, that it is the waking state which is to
be the more vivid, shows the ambiguity of the test In the terror
qui per tenebras repit nearly every one notes a fine psychological
importunity, of stronger effect since waking life is less and less con-
fronted with pestes quapaXam spargunt mortem. Dream-fear may
or may not be interpreted as due to the likelihood that when the
trees rocked the anthropoids would fall; but the intensity of the
fear defies denial, and if the waking consciousness is to be the more
vivid we shall—with Hume—have to explain rather urgently that
' the force of our mental actions . . . is not to be measured by the
apparent agitation of the mind '.
The other fancy is that dreaming is distinguishable because it is
inconsistent. ' Consistency ' may first be taken in its roughest sense,
viz., probability. Even if it is granted that all dreams are improb-
able, no line between waking and dreaming can so be drawn ; thus,
suppose I dream that I go for a bathe, and on turning to the bank
again I see a hippopotamus—" That is what I mean," says the
opponent; " banal enough as a nightmare, but in real life—! " Well,
in the hop-fields of Kent some quite oredible constable?, it was said
a few years back, reported their cognisance of a casual pachyderm.
Unbelief would have cordially vexed these officers. " Your dialec-
tic," the sergeant would have complained, "has been unjust to our
elephant. In my profession men unlearn probability and its false
ideals. A thorough-going mechanical system can never be com-
plete ; and a plot-interest, embodied in all events that happen, is
never actual." True; and his mention of a plot-interest recalls a
marked feature of dreaming; for sometimes a dream-presentation,
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for instance the landscape in a dream, has a singleness of expres-
sion informing the details, and an immediacy and self-justification,
which waking experience does not easily rival. It does rival such
qualities now and then, and in any case the discu-sion must not
end so simply ; otherwise the needed distinction might be found
in the phrase das Leben ist nicht ein Traum, aber es sdllte einer
sein.
Consistency in a stricter sense forms a test applicable in three
ways. A dream may be said to be inconsistent in itself; but in
that case the standard either distint^iishes nothing or confounds
everything. If ' provisionally inconsistent ' is what is meant, then
many dreams are consistent. If ultimate consistency is intended,
then nil experience seemr> inconsistent; any spaced object), any
timed happening, is still a fresh-springing comedy of contradiction—
but there is no need to lubour the obvious here. Another applica-
tion of the test is this : dreams are inconsistent with our waking
states. There is still left, no doubt, an obscurity—on what prin-
ciple do we believe in which state ? However, that point can be
shirked ; for in fact dreams are not always inconsistent with the
waking state. Let me this time have a simpler dream : one night
it seems to me that I lie in bed, and reflect on the difference be-
tween thinking and picturing; suddenly I do not remember what
Kant says about schematism ; I must get up and go into the next
room where there is a Kritik der reinen Vemunft lying open on the
table. I read a passage, and then, happy and mystified, I go back
to bed; when I am in bed I hear the leaves of the book being
turned by the breeze. Upon what principle do I later judge this
to be a dream? " Why," says the opponent, " the electric light
would show you if measurements were exact enough." . Then let
the occasion have, been very early in the morning at midsummer,
when daylight should not be denied even to a believer in Kant.
A Cartesian gives the third rendering: When we wake up, we are
aware of a sudden change ; and this gives us the clue for assuming
two distinct states. Now, we notice that the state into which we
change to-day is more or less connected with the state into which
we changed on the previous morning—the instalments run on and
on, hanging roughly together; but that other state, the one out of
which we change, is on each occasion a lonely incoherency, without
introductory or resumptive neighbours. So the waking state is
coherent in a way, while our dreams are utterly incoherent.
By understanding consistency as ' more or less coherent resump-
tion,' the Cartesian raises four questions. Does to-day's waking
resume the waking life of yesterday ? It does. Can waking take
np a dream-story V and can dreaming take up the story of waking
life ? Unless it is impossible ever to mistake a past dream for a
waking experience, I must say yes and yes. Can to-night's dream-
ing carry on last night's dreaming ? The Cartesian must say
Never. " Serial hallucinations ! " he protests; " Once allow even
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the possibility of them, and you will find no distinction between
waking and dreaming ".
It is indeed plain that the two states are not yet distinguished ;
and the cause of the failure can already be suspected. From the
isolated individual mind there may perhaps be elicited various sorts
of subjectivism, but no kind of cognition. The discussion has paid
the common debt of things Cartesian, and has followed the other
unpremeditated proofs of the grand central truism that ' objective '
means ' shared,' and that it is therefore a far cry to objectivity when
we set out from the unshareable. Hence for a discernment of
dreams the criterion is now indicated ; I must appeal to more than
one consciousness. What is dreamed by one is a dream ; what is
dreamed by several is >'ognition.
At this i)oth the philosophers and the plain men are all displeased
together, observing that dreams cannot so be distinguished. When
dreaming, we often dream of people ; thus, you may dream that
some one blacks your eye. That is a sort of sharing. Further, we
must at least allow for coincident dreaming: suppose A dreams
that he blacks B's eye, and B simultaneously dreams that he has
his eye blacked by A ; the time, after lunch ; the place, the High
Street; the dispute, about Free-will. This is another sort of shar-
ing. Lastly, let us imagine that after the coincident dream A
wakes up witH a light heart, and B with an unclouded eye; the
two men hapi en to meet and quarrel—and this time B has his eye
truly blacked. We have now noticed three kinds of sharing ; and
omniscience alone can tell how on the given principle they are to
be distinguished.
It must be granted that the coincident dream was an embarrass-
ing conspiracy of delirium ; and this annoying fantasy was only
a trial shot—there are trustworthy brickbats to follow. For, the
philosophers will say, if two or three flat-earth men get together,
must wo not be haggard for the earth's spheroidicity? Or if ma-
jorities decide—used not the sun to go round the earth ? And are
not spaced things made up of tiny bits of hard stuff?—for many
men think so, and some shamelessly say so. Objectivity—at least,
your objectivity—is a function of conceited impudence; for if all
men, or all but one, were decently dubious, nothing could be ob-
jective.
Let me for a time suffer the other missiles, and look at the last.
The question is what do the philosophers intend when they call me
impudent ? It is not that they mind a layman trying to think—
he ou^ht, therefore he can (he can try, they mean); but they wish
to point out a certain arbitrariness of process and result When
once a layman tries thinking, you cannot quite tell what will
happen—whether, for example, he will be a circle-squarer, or per-
haps will tie weights to his cycle-wheels ' to assist propulsion '.
Also, misguided laymen may, and sometimes do, agree; so that
you must not define objectivity as an agreement of thinking sub-
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jects—for laymen can agree wrong, and metaphysicians cannot
agree at all.
So far the philosophers make themselves clear; but when
they suggest a decent dubiety, what is it that they want now?
They do not want me to model my conversation on Lear's old
lady of Prague. When a philosopher thumps a table, and de-
mands of me "Is this a table?" he is least of all appeased if I
answer "Perhaps". That is not modest scepticism, it is brazen
eristic. He means me to say: " It is a visible table, and you
thumped it most audibly". I find then that the philosophers'
wish is double; they ask me to see in some things the possibility
of debate, and in others the necessity of concord, even for lay
thinking subjects.
This is good philosophers' sense—and typical philosophers' ma-
lice. They have smuggled away from profane notice the essential
fact, i«. , that everything hei« turns on the sharp distinction be-
tween two aspects of thought—one primary, constructive, and
' automatio ' ; the other secondary, critical, and deliberative. Thus,
in the well-known experiment of negative images,1 the changing
shape of the image clearly depends on an inference; but any ex-
perimenters, whether psychologists, children, or mammalians2
generally, will see similar changing shapes. They must, there-
fore, use the same inference 3 ; but their secondary reflexion on the
matter would be widely diverse—a psychologist bethinks him of
impetuous polemic; a child remembers Pears' soap; a dog might
have convulsions. It is the primary functions—e.g. the recogni-
tion-thought, and 'cause' and 'thing,' and so on—which put
together the objective world; and, as reflexion protests, they put
it together inconsistently. The primary thoughts do not, in ordi-
nary consciousness, appear as thoughts at all. Eeflexion exposes
them, but it cannot reform them. Thus, ' cause' (as a primary)
joins in a special way two bits in a time-picture; and, however
reflexion may insist that in this special way I must either join all
in all or not at all, it cannot check the primary thought, which
imperturbably will so join some bits, and will not so join others. If
I whistle a note, and during it a clock strikes, I cannot with any
effort cognise these events either as cause and effect or as reciprocal
action, though reflexion urges that in objectivity all must be con-
nected, each detail with every detail. Reflexion has never done
badgering the primary thought; if ' cause ' would start, e.g., as
causa sui, and would go on as universal formula working both
ways, and would end as summum bonum, there might perhaps be
some sense in it! Amid the clamour, primary thought remains
sweetly unruflled ; and if there is a picture of two bits of hard
stuff, ' cause ' will transfer movement from one to the other with an
engaging simplicity that drives reflexion into dreadful paroxysms.
1
 Dr. Stout's Manual, n. 306. * A guesa.
1
 So (I think) Schopenhauer.
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The result of the strife is the prettiest paradox possible. In pri-
mary thinking, where inconsistency is the work, a rigid concor-
dance is obtained; either you cannot, or you will not be allowed,
to walk through brick walls. In reflexion, where consistency is
the aim, controversy is unquenchable; so, a blind deaf-and-dumb
man is brought to share a common world with other people, and
then he fights with them about Euclid. His squabble incidentally
brings to notice another cognitive factor; viz., picturing; the two
ways of picturing will for the present purpose be regarded as per-
fectly distinct from either kind of thought, and will be classed as
'automatic,' in the sense that reflexion finds a difficulty in them,
but cannot alter them.
On such a view, elementary cognition will imply only a rather
special case of consistency, viz., agreement in inconsistency. As
regards the automatic factors, the subjects of cognition cacnot be
consistent, but they must agree. It will result that, if a man
pictures communally, and thinks ' cause' and ' thing' and so on
agreeably, then he may be a fire-worshipper or a circle-squarer, or
a spiritualist, or a materialist, yet for all that he will be a fellow-
cognisant.
This time we have cornered dreaming. Cognition in the virtual
agreement of the ' automatic' functions of the subjects of oonscious-
ness; dreaming is their virtual disagreement. Thus let every one
sleep under observation: now if A dreams that he blacks B's eye,
he will be refuted by the watcher; and if B dreams simultaneously
and conversely, the watcher will refute B too. Clearly, some one
has been dreaming; and to decide which was the dreamer, the
appeal is always to more subjects of cognition and their forced
agreement. The watcher is the yawning hieroglyph of the waking
principle.
" But suppose that when I am asleep in b6d, I dream that I am
asleep in bed ; for when asleep we often say ' I am dreaming, and
shall wake by-and-by'. Or, to take a simpler case, suppose that
I always sleep with my eyes open, and at daybreak, while I am
sleeping with my eyes on the window, I dream that dawn is light-
ing the window. I do not yet follow how your principle "
Neither do I, to say frankly; and I am now racked by the
riddle whether to be cheated is to be cheated, when the cheat is
the same as the truth. Before I can make up my mind, the ob-
jector goes on: " You seem to need help. I am not an idealist
myself; but I suppose vaguely that an idealist, when he sees a man
awake, thinks the following thoughts: ' This is a subject of cog-
nition. I do riot mean the man that I see; that is a spaced
object, and a subject of cosiuition is not a spaced object, nor
in space-relation to the objects which it, or any other cog-
nitive subject, constmcts by spacing (together with timing and
primary thinking). Still, I note that certain spaced objects are
especially relevant to certain cognitive subjects; and in that case
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such an object is especially symbolical to other cognitive subjects
who construct it. Thus, when Y kicks Z's shin, each constructs a
spaced shin, a shin symbolical to Y, and relevant to Z. So this
man—this object which I construct in space, and in an interesting
way too, a sharing way, with my primary and communal thought-
reference, implying other subjects of cognition, and with our
picturing schemes which for their part (but not without the primary
thought) produce.in each subject a different picture that yet is
ultimately a picture of coincidence—yes, this man—this object
which I construct, and so do they—this spaced object, I say, I take
to be relevant to a subject of cognition; and the behaviour of the
object is symbolical—I infer from it that the cognitive subject to
which it is relevant, is engaged in constructing a common world
with myself. And well he may be.' But on meeting a somnam-
bulous man, the idealist changes his last thoughts into ' is not con-
structing a common world'! Now let us suppose that during
sleep there is a contraction of some fibres in the brain-complex;
and let us also suppose that by an accident A's skull and parts of
his brain are transparent, and the fibres in question are shown in
a magnified shape to common sight. When the idealist constructs
A's brain-fibres as shortened, he will from this symbolism infer
that the cognitive subject, to which those constructed objects are
relevant, is not constructing a common world with him. Whereat,
if A dreams that (in a mirror) he constructs those fibres so as to
symbolise waking, he will be impeached by the idealist; and if A
dreams that he constructs them so as to symbolise dreaming, he
will convict himself."
Much estranged by this crude and tactless violation of a neat
puzzle, I can do no more than gaze coldly on the objector and
remind him of the wholesome rule that ' ip idealism you do not
talk about the brain'. Then I pull myself together for one last
wild struggle.
Waking can include dreaming, but dreaming cannot include
waking. In this way: imagine that I am drowsy after lunch; I
know that the time is about two o'clock, and that I am in my
chair; I hear people talking, aud a gramophone vociferating—
and yet I do most uudeniably dream that I am reading a page of
Hoi>er, and that I cannot make out why A.e'<uv has been emended
to KJUWF. The waking state is here the container, and the dream-
ing is part-content; for if I am wakefully to know that I dream, I
must wakefully know that I wake. The other way differs; I am
not awake when I only dream that I am only dreaming.
Hereupon all together, man, woman and child, are offended in
the very principle of thinking, and exclaim deplorably, " Why,
my dear, good, muddled person, you can't distinguish " But
let us citch the child apart, since he is more interesting to hear.
"Godfather, is it wrong to dream that you steal?" Well, it
might mean that you would steal, or had stolen. " You see, I
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dreamt that I had had a dream that I took an apple and wasn't
sorry; and I dreamt that I hated having had the dream. Ought
I to be glad?"
Perhaps it is time to end the business. Adopting provisionally
what the enemy wonld call a Kantiun view—that we distinguish
waking vermtige cinei Vcrmogens—I can drop the subject and
listen once more to the topics of serious speculation. However
serious it may be, theory has at times the not unattractive look of
a iraiSui TU>V fjja.OqiJua.Tmv, Yet in supposing that even so 'philos-
ophy has something to do with life,' we shall hardly be unjust to
the latter; indeed, es singt von lauter Meiaphyxik—Ich hor' es
sogar im Traum.
J. A. J. DEEWITT.
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